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Introduction
For decades cultural rights have been a neglected category of human rights.1 Although 
some of the international human rights treaties provide for their protection, none of 
them formulates a comprehensive definition or enumeration. That underdevelopment 
should be attributed, at least in part, to the vagueness of the term ‘culture’.2 International 
legal discourse defines culture in three different contexts. The first one, connected with 
international trade, sees it as a type of commercial product, the second as an effect of 
human practice in the fields of art, music or literature. According to the third one, in-
fluenced mostly by anthropologists and sociologists, culture constitutes a specific way 
of life of a given group of people.3 In this article I  refer to the last understanding of 
culture – as the totality of ideas, customs, traditions, distinctive beliefs and practices of 
specific groups. This understanding is in accordance with the definition developed in the 
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, which states: “culture should be 
regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of 
society or a social group [...] it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, 
ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.”4 
1 J. Symonides, Cultural rights: a neglected category of human rights, “International Social Science 
Journal” 1998, vol. 50, no. 158, pp. 559–572. 
2 Ibidem, p. 560.
3 M. al Attar, N. Aylwin, R.J. Coombe, Indigenous Cultural Heritage Rights in International Hu-
man Rights Law, in Protection of First Nations Cultural Heritage: Laws, Policy, and Reform, ed. 
C. Bell, R.K. Paterson,Vancouver – Toronto 2009, pp. 330–331. See also the three understand-
ings of the term culture formulated in R. Williams, Keywords. A vocabulary of culture and society, 
New York 1985, pp. 87–93. 
4 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, 2 November 2001, Resolution of 
the 31st General Conference of UNESCO. A similar definition had been already formulated 
by a Mexico City Declaration on Cultural policies, according to which culture is “the whole 
complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize 
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It should be no surprise that the majority of claims concerning cultural rights come 
from vulnerable groups, i.e. minorities and indigenous people. That tendency shows that 
they are the most threatened by infringements in that field. The first significant exam-
ples of the imposition of a ‘cultural hegemony’ date back to colonial times. It was then 
that indigenous communities became outnumbered by the influx of colonists. One of 
the undesirable results of the interaction between the indigenous peoples and the de-
scendants of the settlers was the dominance of a  hegemonic culture over traditional 
cultures. It proceeded in conformity with the ideology of supremacy over the conquered 
communities. As Edward Said rightly pointed out, “almost all colonial schemes begin 
with an assumption of native backwardness and general inadequacy to be independent, 
‘equal’ and fit.”5 Steps taken in order to seize the lands and resources, involving atrocities 
and policies of discrimination against indigenous people, have been justified, inter alia, 
through references to Darwin’s theory of evolution, according to which the stronger will 
always extirpate the weaker.6 The author himself observed that “wherever the European 
has trod, death seems to pursue the aboriginal.”7 Many years later that fact was acknowl-
edged by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which 
states: “indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, 
their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus pre-
venting them from exercising, in particular, their right to development in accordance 
with their own needs and interests.”8 
Colonial times are over, but the prejudice against differences persists. To date, the cul-
tures of minorities are at risk mostly due to the States’ interference in their ways of life. 
Above all, that refers to indigenous peoples, who are the most underprivileged group of 
that category. Originally considered as backward, today perceived as a threat to progress 
– indigenous peoples are often urged to abandon their lands. This does not necessarily 
occur through direct dispossession, but rather through the State’s undesirable interfer-
ence in landscapes, which may jeopardise the cultural customs of tribal communities. 
a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the 
fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs”. V. Mexico City 
Declaration on Cultural Policies, 6 August 1982, adopted during second World Conference on 
Cultural Policies.
5 E.W. Said, Culture and Imperialism, New York 1993, p. 80.
6 S. Lindqvist, Terra Nullius. Podróż przez ziemię niczyją, Warszawa 2010, pp. 39–41. 
7 The same observation was shared by the ethnologist James Prichard, who noted: “Wherever 
Europeans have settled, their arrival has been the harbinger of extermination to the native 
tribes.” V. A.D. Moses, Genocide and Settler Society, in Australian History in Genocide and Settler 
Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History, ed. A.D. Moses, 
New York – Oxford 2004, p. 5.
8 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 13 September 2007, A/RES/ 
61/295.
Cultural Rights and Cultural Identity... | 121 
Consequently, the States’ efforts have led to a rise in the ethnic consciousness of mi-
norities.9 Over time, endeavours to secure the rights of these minorities have acquired 
a more organised character, such that their voices could be heard in international forums. 
However, the process leading to a final acknowledgement of minority rights took long 
a long time. After the Second World War, the international community awoke to the 
dangers of racial and religious discrimination, but ironically did not recognize the issue 
of minority protection as a distinctive problem. Thanks to the UN Charter, the rights of 
minorities were confined to the human rights framework and for a long time realized in 
line with the principle of non-discrimination.10 Undoubtedly, the problem of minority 
protection was marginalized due to post-war struggles for political stability and the ter-
ritorial integrity of States. ‘Positive protection’ of minorities was finally possible thanks 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights11 (henceforth referred to as 
‘the Covenant’ or ICCPR) – the first internationally binding document that includes 
a provision specifically referring to minority rights. Article 27 of the Covenant reads as 
follows, “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own 
religion, or to use their own language”. 
In other words, minorities are granted the right to live as they choose – in accordance 
with their own traditions, customs and beliefs. All these rights fall under the notion of 
the so-called ‘right to cultural identity’ – a term commonly used in soft law instruments, 
and international legal discourse, but overlooked by legally binding instruments under 
international law. The notion cultural identity, appears in General Comment no. 23 on 
The Rights of Minorities, although without further elaboration. Interpreting the provi-
sions of Article 27, the Human Rights Committee has found that “[...] the protection 
of these rights is directed towards ensuring the survival and continued development of 
the cultural, religious and social identity of the minorities concerned, thus enriching the 
fabric of society as a whole.”12 To better understand the concept of cultural identity, it 
seems reasonable to refer to General Comment no. 21 on the Right of Everyone to Take 
Part in Cultural Life, which provides a more detailed elaboration. The document reads 
9 R.G. Buendia, Ethnic Identity, Self-Determination and Human Rights: A  Re-Examination of 
Majoritarian Democracy, “Kasarinlan. Philippine Journal of Third World Studies” 1993, vol. 8, 
no. 4: The NDF at 20: A Front United?, p. 83.
10 A.F. Vrdoljak, Minorities, Cultural Rights and the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage, pa-
per presented at the ESIL (European Society for International Law) Research Forum on Interna-
tional Law, Conference on Contemporary Issues, 26–29 May 2005. 
11 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, A/RES/21/2200.
12 Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 23: The Rights of Minorities (Article 27), 
8 April 1994, Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5.
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as follows: “[...] minorities have the right to their cultural diversity, traditions, customs, 
religion, forms of education, languages, communication media (press, radio, television, 
Internet) and other manifestations of their cultural identity and membership.”13 There-
fore, the statement that culture “encompasses all manifestations of human existence”14 
appears justified. Further detailing of the cultural rights of minorities can be attributed 
to the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities,15 which was inspired by the provisions of Article 27 of the 
ICCPR. Article 1(1) of the document reads, “States shall protect the existence and the 
national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their 
respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity”.
Interestingly, scientific discourse provides various justifications for the need to secure 
cultural identity. Some people recognize a close link between culture and sovereignty, 
and argue that cultural identity constitutes the essential element.16 There are also those 
putting forward even more daring opinions – that genocide occurs through the destruc-
tion of cultural identity.17 According to the most common view, the individual’s person-
ality is realized through his/her culture, hence, to respect a person, it is vital to give due 
consideration to all manifestations of his/her cultural identity, including ways of life, 
religion and language. 
After the ICCPR came into force, the struggle for cultural identity may be reflected 
in recourse to procedures available under the auspices of the United Nations. Through 
the complaint procedure of the Human Rights Committee, individuals may bring 
cases against States that have ratified the aforementioned International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol.18 In light of the collective char-
13 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment no. 21: Right of 
Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (Article 15, § 1 (a)), 21 December 2009, Doc. E/C.12/
GC/21, § 32.
14 Ibidem, § 11.
15 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguis-
tic Minorities, 18 December 1992, A/RES/47/135. 
16 According to V.J. Deloria indigenous sovereignty “consists more of a continued cultural integ-
rity than of political powers and to that degree that a nation loses its sense of cultural identity, 
to that degree it suffers a loss of sovereignty.” Cited from: S. Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and Continuing Challenges, “The European Journal of Interna-
tional Law” 2011, no. 22, p. 129.
17 K. Anderson, Colonialism and Cold Genocide: The Case of West Papua, “Genocide Studies and 
Prevention: An International Journal” 2015, no. 9: Time, Movement, and Space: Genocide Stud-
ies and Indigenous Peoples, p. 16. “Yet, where cultural genocide is linked inextricably to physical 
genocide, acts that may be characterised as cultural genocide should in fact be plainly consid-
ered genocide.”
18 The Human Rights Committee exercises control over the implementation of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by its state parties by means of different types of proce-
dures. The first one – periodic reporting – involves State’s obligation to submit reports on how 
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acter of the rights falling under the notion of the right to cultural identity, they act as 
the “representatives” and peculiar “guards” of values pertaining to the community they 
belong to.19 
So far, Article 27 of the Covenant has been invoked forty times in the aforemen-
tioned procedure before the Human Rights Committee. The complaints were based 
on various grounds: ranging from interference with ancestral lands (as invoked by the 
Sami people against Finland, Norway and Sweden; the Aymara people against Peru; or 
the indigenous community of Maori against New Zealand), restrictions on the right to 
profess and practise one’s own religion, to infringements of the right to use a minority 
language (brought most commonly by Bretons against France). The Committee has, so 
far, adopted views relating to twenty-seven individual communications, deciding on the 
inadmissibility of the others. Nearly half of these cases have been brought before the 
Committee by indigenous communities claiming to be victims of the violation of the 
right of individuals to enjoy their own culture together with the other members of the 
group. The examples presented below demonstrate that steps taken by the State in the 
name of economic development might have an undesirable impact on territories, and 
may hamper the execution of cultural rights pertaining to those distinct communities. 
That issue is addressed at the beginning of this article, with specific regard given to 
the concept of land in indigenous peoples’ cultures. Then, I focus on the subject of re-
spect for the right to profess and practice a minority religion. Despite the scarcity of 
the Committee’s jurisprudential elaboration in that field, it can be undeniably stated 
that respect for this right is vital for the full realisation of the right to cultural identity. 
So is, of course, the right to use a minority language, which is addressed in the sub-
sequent part of the article. Last but not least, the study aims to present the phenom-
enon of ethnocide, and tries to answer whether this still poses a danger for minority 
cultures. 
the rights are being implemented. Possible concerns and recommendations of the Committee 
are voiced in so-called ‘concluding observations.’ Thanks to the publication of Committee’s 
findings public attention focuses on a country under review. The complaints procedure, on the 
other hand, enables individuals to bring cases against States that have ratified the Covenant 
and its Optional Protocol. 
19 F. Lanzerini, Indigenous Peoples’ Cultural Rights and the Controversy over Commercial Use of their 
Traditional Knowledge, in Cultural Human Rights, ed. F. Francioni, M. Scheinin, Leiden – Bos-
ton 2008, pp. 125–126. A. Jakubowski refers to minorities and indigenous peoples as specific 
categories of collective cultural rights holders, A. Jakubowski, Introduction, in Cultural Rights 
as Collective Rights: An International Law Perspective, ed. A. Jakubowski, Leiden 2016, p. 7. 
For an elaboration on cultural rights as a collective entitlement also: K. Hossain, Protection of 
Community Culture as Part of Human Rights in International Law, in Cultural Rights..., op. cit., 
pp. 113–132.
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The right to enjoy one’s own culture  
in the case-law of Human Rights Committee
Land as the Foundation of Indigenous Cultures
One of the characteristics that best describes those culturally distinct identities is their 
strong relationship with the land and dependence on natural resources as the means 
of livelihood. Their modes of production, and consequently ways of life, are being ad-
justed to environmental conditions. They are even called , “ecosystem people” by some 
authors since they constitute an intrinsic part of the ecosystem.20 That distinctive feature 
of the indigenous peoples was also recognized in the UNESCO Declaration of San Jose, 
adopted on the wave of protests against the loss of cultural identity among the Indian 
populations of Latin America:
 “For the Indian peoples, the land is not only an object of possession and production. 
It forms the basis of their existence, both physical and spiritual, as an independent entity. 
Territorial space is the foundation and source of their relationship with the universe and 
the mainstay of their view of the world.”21
A spiritual attitude towards land and natural resources characterizes many culturally 
distinct entities. For instance, the Quichua22 believe that spirits living within moun-
tains, hills and rivers exercise control over plants and animals.23 The Massai people per-
ceive land as God-given and therefore belonging to the entire community. They worship 
Mother Earth as a source of spirituality for human lives.24 In the Samburu’s culture, land 
and the environment are even subjects of songs, which praise their importance for all 
generations.25 For tribal Filipinos, the land, as a source of life, is owned by God, however, 
people as ‘secondary owners’, have the right to exploit it. They emphasise that there is 
an inseparable bond between land ownership and a people’s identity.26 Being completely 
20 P.L. Bennagan, Tribal Filipinos, in Indigenous Views of Land and the Environment, ed. S.H. 
Davis, World Bank Discussion Paper no. 188, Washington DC 1993, p. 67.
21 UNESCO Declaration of San Jose, 11 December 1981, UNESCO Doc. FS 82/WF.32 (1982).
22 The largest Indian group of indigenous peoples in the Ecuadorian Amazon.
23 S.H. Davis, Introduction, in Indigenous Views..., op. cit., p. 14.
24 K. Matampash, The Massai of Kenya, in Indigenous Views..., op. cit., pp. 32, 35–36. 
25 G. Lochgan, The Samburu of Kenya, in Indigenous Views..., op. cit., pp. 46–47. One of the Sam-
buru dwellings goes: “Your father will be telling you when you look after cows, ‘this day go 
through here, now take this route’ and you will slowly learn why he is telling you that. When 
you become a moran you will be allowed to attend elders meetings when they discuss and de-
cide; ‘all families would move to this or the other side,’ ‘all cows should be driven to some place 
for this period because we want this land to recover here.’” Ibidem, pp. 46–47. 
26 P.L. Bennagan, op. cit., pp. 68–70. Part of the summary of responses obtained during the con-
sultation conducted in Mindanao (1985) by the Episcopal Commission on Tribal Filipinos of 
the Roman Catholic Church reads: “land is also seen as a symbol of identity. It symbolizes 
their historical identity because they see it as an ancestral heritage that is to be defended and 
preserved for all future generations. It symbolizes their local identity because they believe that 
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dependent on the environment, indigenous peoples developed specific systems to protect 
it. Interestingly, many of the land management practices involve various religious rites, 
exercised in order to placate spirits responsible for the natural world.27 Since some of 
them constitute a tradition handed down from parents to children, they have remained 
essentially unchanged to this day. The concept of land ownership has also remained con-
stant. Since the land belongs to God, people are only trustees. Undoubtedly, the strong 
bond between indigenous peoples and their ancestral lands constitutes an essential part 
of their identity. Therefore, external influences that have an undesirable impact on their 
landscapes may hamper the execution of basic rights pertaining to them. Consequently, 
some of the State’s measures that were undertaken in order to promote economic devel-
opment and which involved a significant interference with the environment have been 
have been deemed to be in violation of Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.28 Judicial elaboration of the Committee helps to answer the ques-
tion on how to define the culture of a minority group and what roles economic activities 
play in that culture. 
Indigenous cultural rights  
before the Human Rights Committee
According to the Committee, the right to enjoy one’s own culture is very closely related 
to the right to engage in economic and social activities that are part of the culture of 
a distinct community. Analysis of the Human Rights Committee’s jurisprudence shows 
that there is a wide range of such activities.29 
For instance, in the most recent case, Ángela Poma Poma v. Peru,30 the Committee 
dealt with a complaint brought by a member of an ethnic minority called the Aymara. 
The activity that took center stage in the Committee’s examinations was the raising of 
wherever they are born, there too shall they die and be buried, and their own graves are proof 
of their rightful ownership of the land. It symbolizes their tribal identity because it stands for 
their unity, and if the land is lost, the tribe, too, shall be lost.” Ibidem, p. 69. 
27 Ibidem, p. 75.
28 The significant influence of modernization on the cultural identities of distinct communities 
was very appropriately recognized by R.G. Buendia, who stated: “while it is commonly argued 
that for economic growth and development to take place, certain cultural identities have to be 
compromised and undermined for the interest of the majority, these culturally homogenizing, 
socially fragmenting, and atomizing processes of modernization bring in conditions of social 
and economic vulnerability and insecurity to ethnic groups.” V. R.G. Buendia, op. cit., p. 83.
29 In order to establish what kinds of economic and social activities constitute a part of minorities’ 
culture the Committee carries out a peculiar ‘cultural test.’ V. J. Gilbert, Nomadic Peoples and 
Human Rights, London – New York 2014, pp. 177–178. 
30 Human Rights Committee, Ángela Poma Poma v. Peru, Communication no. 1457/2006, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006.
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livestock, principally alpacas and llamas, which form the basis of the Aymara’s economy 
and culture. Until the Government of Peru significantly interfered in the landscape, it 
was the only means of survival for the author and her family. The State’s actions were 
aimed at the diversion of water from the Andes to the Pacific coast in order to provide 
water for the city of Tacna. The community did not manage to forestall the implementa-
tion of the project and, as a consequence of the diversion of the river and well-drilling 
carried on over many years, animals were deprived of water, which lead to the death of 
a great deal of livestock. 
The author of the complaint alleged that the State’s actions constituted a violation of 
Article 1 § 231 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, by depriving 
her of her livelihood, and of Article 1732, by interference in her family’s life and activi-
ties, since, as she rightly stipulated “[...] private and family life consists of their customs, 
social relations, the Aymara language and methods of grazing and caring for animals. 
This has all been affected by the diversion of water.” Having examined the presented 
facts, the Committee found that they rather raised issues related to Article 27 of the 
Covenant, and declared the communication admissible in respect of the complaints un-
der its provisions.33 
The Committee observed that the steps taken by the State in order to promote eco-
nomic development should comply with the proportionality principle.34 It also found 
that prior participation of a  specific community in the decision-making process may 
legitimatize the State’s measures.35 Since, in this case no consultations were held with 
the community, no studies were carried out in order to assess the possible impact of the 
undertaken measures on the traditional activities of the Aymara people, nor were any ac-
tions applied in order to minimize the negative consequences, the Committee found that 
the State’s activities violated the author’s right to enjoy her own culture together with the 
other members of her group, in accordance with Article 27 of the Covenant. The finding 
31 “2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources 
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based 
upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived 
of its own means of subsistence.”
32 “1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home 
or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”
33 Ángela Poma Poma v. Peru, § 6.5.
34 “Economic development may not undermine the rights protected by Article 27. Thus the lee-
way the State has in this area should be commensurate with the obligations it must assume 
under Article 27.” Ibidem, § 7.4.
35 “In the Committee’s view, the admissibility of measures which substantially compromise or 
interfere with the culturally significant economic activities of a minority or indigenous com-
munity depends on whether the members of the community in question have had the oppor-
tunity to participate in the decision-making process in relation to these measures and whether 
they will continue to benefit from their traditional economy.” Ibidem, § 7.6.
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confirmed – as had already been stated in the aforementioned General Comment No. 23 
on The Rights of Minorities, which clarifies the provisions of Article 27 ICCPR – that 
the right to enjoy one’s culture may be manifested in a particular way of life.36 
It also followed some previous verdicts concerning the measures of States which pose 
a  threat to the cultures of minorities. Many of them involved the complaints of the 
Sami people brought against Finland, Norway, and Sweden. For instance in Ivan Kitok 
v. Sweden,37 the author of the complaint claimed that, as a result of government’s legis-
lation (Reindeer Husbandry Act of 1971),38 he was denied his “inherited ‘civil right’ to 
reindeer breeding” and argued that it was equal to preventing the exercise of the right to 
enjoy the culture of the Sami. The Committee acknowledged the importance of reindeer 
husbandry for the Sami community and found that “the regulation of an economic ac-
tivity is normally a matter for the State alone. However, where that activity is an essential 
element in the culture of an ethnic community, its application to an individual may fall 
under Article 27 of the Covenant.”39
In Länsman et al. v. Finland 40 reindeer breeding activity also took center stage in 
the Committee’s examinations. This case dealt with a  complaint concerning the pro-
cess of stone quarrying, which had an impact on reindeer herding in traditional Sami 
lands. Although the Committee did not find a breach of Article 27 (the State met the 
requirement of the consultation voiced in Comment no. 23), it conceded that reindeer 
36 “With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under Article 27, the Committee 
observes that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associ-
ated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may 
include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves pro-
tected by law.” V. Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 23: The Rights of Minorities 
(Article 27), § 7.
37 The Human Rights Committee, Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, Communication no. 197/1985, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985.
38 According to the State, the ratio legis of the Reindeer Husbandry Act was to secure the well-
being of the Sami, who occupy in reindeer husbandry. In practice, however, it restricted the 
number of reindeer breeders and provided for rearrangements in existing Sami villages – under 
new legislation they were reorganized into larger units. Substantial changes in that field have 
resulted in huge interference in the social structures of the Sami community, since “the Sami 
villages have their origin in the old siida, which originally formed the base of the Sami society 
consisting of a community of families which migrated seasonally from one hunting, fishing and 
trapping area to another, and which later on came to work with and follow a particular self-
contained herd of reindeer from one seasonal grazing area to another.” Ibidem, § 4.2. What is 
more, Swedish legislation granted the Sami population the power to decide on issues of mem-
bership in Sami villages, causing the division of the Sami community into reindeer-herding 
(full Sami) and non-reindeer herding (half-Sami). It resulted in difficulties in maintaining the 
Sami identity for the latter group. 
39 Ibidem, § 9.2.
40 Human Rights Committee, Länsman et al. v. Finland, Communication no. 511/1992, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/52D/511/1992.
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husbandry constitutes a  traditional activity which deserves protection. In the second 
Länsman case brought before it, the Committee assessed the impact of logging and the 
construction of roads on such traditional economic practices.41 
In Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada42, on the other hand, the Committee ruled that Can-
ada had violated minority rights under Article 27, by allowing the provincial government 
of Alberta to expropriate the land of Lubicon Lake Band for private corporate interests 
(such as leases for oil and gas exploration) notwithstanding prior arrangements granting 
the original inhabitants of that area the right to continue their traditional way of life. 
Similarly, in Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand 43 the Committee examined the 
complaint submitted by individuals belonging to the Maori people of New Zealand. 
Due to a dramatic growth in the fishing industry, the government decided to implement 
a mechanism for the conservation of New Zealand’s fisheries resources and to regulate 
commercial fishing. The adoption of new measures provided in the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act had an unintended negative impact on Maori fishers. 
Since fishing constitutes an essential element of traditional Maori culture, they main-
tained that the State’s actions threatened both their ways of life and culture. What is 
more, the authors claimed that they were denied the right to determine their politi-
cal status, as the right to self-determination can be exercised only with full access to, 
and control over, resources.44 In this case, the Committee did not find the State party 
in violation of Article 27, mostly because of its engagement in the consultation pro-
cess, during which the cultural and religious significance of fishing for the Maori was 
acknowledged.45 However, it emphasised that any steps that may affect the economic 
activities of the Maori must be taken in a way that ensures the authors’ right to enjoy 
their culture, and profess and practice their religion in a community with other members 
of their group.46
Judicial elaboration confirms an undoubted and strong bond between indigenous 
peoples’ cultures and land rights. Economic activities which constitute an essential ele-
ment of the culture of a community may fall within the ambit of the right to enjoy one’s 
own culture. Therefore, the right to preserve their distinct identity involves, above all, 
the possibility to continue their inherited ways of life. Dispossessing a community of 
41 Human Rights Committee, Länsman et al. v. Finland, Communication no. 671/1995, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995.
42 Human Rights Committee, Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication no. 167/1984, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984
43 Human Rights Committee, Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, Communication no. 
547/1993, UN Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993.
44 Ibidem, § 6.1. 
45 Ibidem, §§ 9.5, 9.6, 9.8.
46 Ibidem, § 9.9.
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its economic livelihood may, under certain circumstances, be equal to robbing it of its 
cultural identity.47 It, therefore, has an impact going far beyond financial consequences. 
Indigenous peoples’ rights of ownership and possession over the land and its natural 
resources are commonly recognized by international law.48 Unfortunately, however, such 
cases of resistance to state-proposed projects involving interference with ancestral lands 
and unceasing struggles for a respect for indigenous customs and ways of life prove the 
continuing relevance of the problem. A statement made in 1989 by Morinage Parkipuny 
remains true to date. Before the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Popu-
lations he said: “the process of alienation of our land and its resources was launched by 
European colonial authorities at the beginning of this century and has been carried on, 
to date, after the attainment of national independence.”49 
The right to profess and practise a minority religion
The Committee has twice dealt with complaints invoking an infringement of Article 27 
in the context of a minority’s right to profess and practice their own religion. In neither 
of them, however, was a violation found. For instance, in the case Prince v. South Africa50 
the author of the complaint, who was a Rastafarian, i.e. a member of a religious minority 
group in South Africa, claimed that the State had infringed his rights by prohibiting the 
possession and use of cannabis.51 Gareth Anver Prince was a law graduate and wanted to 
become an attorney. Having fulfilled all the academic requirements, he had to perform 
a period of community service before being allowed to practice. He filed an application 
to the relevant body (the Law Society of Cape of Good Hope) to register his contract of 
community service but was refused due to his prior convictions for possessing cannabis. 
47 “Culture or way of life cannot survive if the bearers of that culture have to change their ways of 
making a living.” V. D. Maybury-Lewis, Indigenous Peoples, Ethnic Groups, and the State, Boston 
– London – Toronto – Sydney – Tokyo – Singapore 1997, p. 37.
48 V. Articles 13–16 of International Labour Organization Convention (no. 169) concerning In-
digenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 27 June 1989, adopted during 76th ILC 
session and Articles 25–26 of United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
49 M. Parkipuny, The Human Rights Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Africa, Statement before the 
Sixth Session of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Genéve, 
Switzerland on August 3, 1989, “Fourth World Journal” 1989, vol. II, no. 2, http://cwis.org/
FWJ/classic/?issue=117# [access: 15.01.2017].
50 Human Rights Committee, Prince v. South Africa, Communication no. 1474/2006, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/91/D/1474/2006. 
51 The Rastafari religion originated in Jamaica. It’s roots lie in the black consciousness move-
ment that sought to overthrow colonialism, oppression and domination. The use of cannabis 
constitutes an inherent element of that religion. Regarded as a “holy herb” it is used at religious 
gatherings, as well as in private homes. At religious ceremonies, it is smoked through a chalice 
(water-pipe) as part of Holy Communion, and burnt as incense. However, it is used not only 
for spiritual, but also for medical and even culinary purposes. Ibidem, § 2.1. 
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In other words, the Law Society’s assessment was that he was not a  “fit and proper” 
candidate. Before the Committee, he claimed that Rastafarians use and possess cannabis 
for religious purposes and postulated that they should be granted an exemption from the 
general prohibition of possession and use of that drug. The Committee acknowledged 
the fact that the use of cannabis is inherent to the manifestation of the Rastafari religion, 
but at the same time concluded that the freedom of religion and the right of minorities 
to profess and practice it freely, as guaranteed in Articles 18 and 27, are not absolute and 
can be limited in order to protect public safety, order, health, morals, or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others.
In Waldman v. Canada52, on the other hand, the Committee had to find whether in 
light of Ontario’s exclusive funding of Roman Catholic schools,53 the lack of funding to 
other religious schools constituted a violation of Articles 2654 and 27 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The author of the complaint, a member of the 
Jewish faith, pointed out that non-secular schools “form an essential link in preserving 
community identity and the survival of minority religious groups and that positive ac-
tion may be required to ensure that the rights of religious minorities are protected.”55 The 
Committee acknowledged differential treatment between the Roman Catholic faith and 
the author’s religious denomination in the field of educational funding, and found the 
State party in breach of Article 26.56 Unfortunately, however, it did not address the issue 
of the infringement of Article 27.57
52 Human Rights Committee, Waldman v. Canada, Communication no. 694/1996, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996.
53 The Canadian Constitution Act (1867) provides for exclusive jurisdiction of each province in 
Canada to enact acts regarding education. In Ontario that power is exercised through the Edu-
cation Act, under which only Roman Catholic schools are entitled to public funding on equal 
terms with public secular schools. Ibidem, § 2.3.
54 “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee 
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status”.
55 Waldman v. Canada, § 3.5.
56 “The Covenant does not oblige States parties to fund schools which are established on a reli-
gious basis. However, if a State party chooses to provide public funding to religious schools, it 
should make this funding available without discrimination. This means that providing funding 
for the schools of one religious group and not for another must be based on reasonable and 
objective criteria. In the instant case, the Committee concludes that the material before it does 
not show that the differential treatment between the Roman Catholic faith and the author’s 
religious denomination is based on such criteria. Consequently, there has been a violation of 
the author’s rights under article 26 of the Covenant to equal and effective protection against 
discrimination”. Ibidem, § 10.6.
57 Although a member, Martin Scheinin concurred with the finding, in his individual opinion, 
he pointed out that “the existence of public Roman Catholic schools in Ontario is related to 
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The right to use a minority language
Last, but not least, the Committee deals with complaints of minorities claiming to be 
deprived of their right to use their own language. Interestingly, almost a half of these 
cases were filed by French citizens born in Bretagne who claimed the right to use Breton, 
which is their mother tongue.58 In none of them, however, was the infringement of Arti-
cle 27 stated. The violation of this Article in the context of language rights was noted in 
the case of Rakhim Mavlonov and Shansiy Sa’di v. Uzbekistan.59 The complaint concerned 
a denial of re-registration of a newspaper published in a minority language by the State 
party’s authorities. The authors of the communication (both Uzbek citizens of Tajik ori-
gin) claimed that they had fallen victims to violations of Article 1960 and Article 27, read 
together with Article 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The 
articles of “Oina” were published almost exclusively in the Tajik language and concerned 
education or cultural matters.61 Therefore, the newspaper constituted a unique messenger 
a historical arrangement for minority protection and hence needs to be addressed not only 
under article 26 of the Covenant but also under articles 27 and 18.” He found, inter alia, that 
“article 27 imposes positive obligations for States to promote religious instruction in minority 
religions.” Ibidem, individual opinion by member Martin Scheinin, §§ 4 and 5.
58 See Human Rights Committee, Yves Cadoret, Hervé Le Bihan v. France, Communication no. 
323/1988, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/41/D/323/1988; Hervé Barzhig v. France, Communication no. 
327/1988, UN Doc. CCPR/C/41/D/327/1988; Dominique Guesdon v. France, Communication 
no. 219/1986, UN Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/219/1986. Actually, none of these cases were examined 
on the merits with regard to Article 27. The French government filed a “declaration” concern-
ing Article 27 of the Covenant, claiming it was not applicable, since the French Constitution 
guarantees the equality of all citizens before the law. The Committee treated the declaration 
as a reservation to Article 27, and as a consequence it lacks jurisdiction over cases concerning 
the Breton language. Unfortunately, such a declaration amounts to a denial of the existence of 
minority groups in the country. 
59 Human Rights Committee, Rakhim Mavlanov and Shansiy Sa’di v. Uzbekistan, Communica-
tion no. 1334/2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004.
60 “1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, 
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The exercise of the rights pro-
vided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may 
therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law 
and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection 
of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.”
61 The Committee adhered to the author’s claim that ‘Oina’ published articles containing edu-
cational and other materials for Tajik students and young persons on events and matters of 
cultural interest to this readership, as well as reported on the particular difficulties facing the 
continued provision of education to Tajik youth in their own language, including shortages in 
Tajik-language textbooks, low wages for teachers and the forced opening of Uzbek-language 
classes in some Tajik schools. See Rakhim Mavlanov and Shansiy Sa’di v. Uzbekistan, § 8.7
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of Tajik’s culture to its readers. Problems appeared when, as a consequence of one of the 
founders’ opt-out, the newspaper had to apply for re-registration. The authorities refused 
to re-register the newspaper due to an alleged violation of the Law “On Mass Media.”62 
Most importantly, in light of the issues addressed in this article, the Committee’s 
verdict proved that culture manifests itself in many forms and the right to enjoy it freely 
may also involve access to minority language press. In the analysed case, the Committee 
found that: “[...] the use of a minority language press as means of airing issues of signifi-
cance and importance to the Tajik minority community in Uzbekistan, by both editors 
and readers, is an essential element of the Tajik minority’s culture.”63 In other words, the 
Committee acknowledged the important role of language in defining cultural identity, 
since it constitutes one of the representatives of the distinct characteristics of a commu-
nity. Consequently, it fosters the sense of belonging to a certain group. A further detail-
ing of the minorities’ language rights can be attributed to the Declaration on the Rights 
of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, which 
in Article 4(3) reads: “States should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, 
persons belonging to minorities may have adequate opportunities to learn their mother 
tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue.” A strong relationship between 
language and culture was also stressed by the famous linguist, Ken Hale, who lamented: 
“When you lose a language, you lose a culture, intellectual wealth, a work of art. It’s like 
dropping a bomb on a museum, the Louvre.”64 
Ethnocide in international legal discourse
The very term ethnocide appeared for the first time in Lemkin’s “Axis Rule in Occupied 
Europe.” When elaborating on the new term and conception for the destruction of 
nations, Lemkin pointed out that instead of genocide, by which we mean the destruc-
tion of a nation or of an ethnic group, the term ethnocide can be used to express the 
same idea.65 Interestingly, in his research Lemkin focused on the cultural elements of 
the crime: “genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the op-
pressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor.”66 It 
62 According to the commission, the newspaper’s work was not performed in accordance with 
mass media activity towards “enlightment and national ideology building”. It accused “Oina” 
of, inter alia, publishing articles that were inciting inter-ethnic hostility and violating laws 
prohibiting calls for territorial integrity changes. Ibidem, § 2.6.
63 Ibidem, § 8.7.
64 Cited from: K.D. Harrison, When Languages Die: The Extinction of the World’s Languages and the 
Erosion of Human Knowledge, New York 2007, p. 7.
65 R. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals 
for Redress, New Jersey 2005, p. 79. 
66 Ibidem.
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appears that according to Lemkin, cultural patterns are as important as the biological 
structure of a distinct group. Indeed, his objective was to include cultural aspects in the 
legal definition of genocide.67 In his view, the cultural facet of the crime involved a ban 
on the use of the native language, and upbringing in the spirit of imposed ideology in or-
der to suppress independent national thinking.68 However, his postulates were not fully 
taken into account, and the only cultural aspect included in the final legal definition of 
the crime of genocide is laid down in Article 2 (e) of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Genocide, and concerns the act of forcibly transferring children of 
the group to another group.69
In the following years, the term ethnocide evolved, and is now more often considered 
strictly as the policy of destroying other cultures.70 Consequently, such practices as exter-
minating a culture have been called a cultural or passive genocide, although they do not 
necessarily involve the physical destruction of a group.71 
In 1981, UNESCO created an international definition of this phenomenon. Accord-
ing to the aforementioned Declaration of San Jose: “ethnocide means that an ethnic 
group is denied the right to enjoy, develop and transmit its own culture and its own 
language, whether collectively or individually. This involves an extreme form of massive 
violation of human rights and, in particular, the right of ethnic groups to respect for their 
cultural identity [...] ethnocide, that is, cultural genocide, is a violation of international 
law equivalent to genocide, which was condemned by the United Nations Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948.” 
67 For detailed research on the evolution of the term genocide see H. Schreiber, Cultural gen-
ocide – ludobójstwo kulturowe – kulturobójstwo: niedokończony czy odrzucony projekt prawa 
międzynarodowego?, in Kultura w  stosunkach międzynarodowych, t. I:  Zwrot kulturowy, ed. 
H. Schreiber, G. Michałowska, Warszawa 2013, pp. 252–274; E. Novic, From ‘Genocide’ to ‘Per-
secution’: ‘Cultural Genocide’ and Contemporary International Criminal Law, in Cultural Rights..., 
op. cit., pp. 313–335.
68 R. Lemkin, op. cit., pp. 84–85. In fact, Lemkin distinguished eight different types of genocide 
(or as he called it: “techniques of genocide in various fields”) – political, social, cultural, eco-
nomic, biological, physical, religious and moral. Ibidem, pp. 82–90.
69 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 
1948, A/RES/3/260. 
70 W.A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, Cambridge 2000, p. 189; 
M.  Shaw, What is genocide?, Cambridge 2007, pp. 65–67; B. Clavero, Genocide or Ethnocide, 
1933-2007. How to make, unmake, and remake law with words, Milan 2008, pp. 99–101.
71 Undoubtedly, however, cultural suppression may precede and herald the crime of genocide 
and prove the perpetrator’s genocidal intent (mens rea). What is more, in the jurisprudence of 
international criminal tribunals and courts, the link between cultural suppression and persecu-
tion, which constitutes one of the acts defining the crime against humanity, was found. Acts 
directed against cultural heritage are generally perceived as an instrument of repression and 
an element of the strategy of dehumanisation. For detailed research see S. Stryjkowska, Prob-
lematyka ochrony dziedzictwa kulturowego w działalności międzynarodowych trybunałów karnych, 
“Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review” 2016, vol. 6, pp. 222–225. 
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In light of the above, it is worth considering whether the problem of ethnocide still 
threatens native cultures. It is an undisputed fact that minorities throughout the world 
are being coerced to give up their cultural customs, languages and religious traditions. 
The foregoing considerations prove that minority cultures at risk mostly due to States’ 
interference in their ways of life, restrictions on the use of their native language, or in-
fringements of the right to practice one’s own religion. The cases referred to in this arti-
cle show that the steps taken by States with regard to minorities may constitute a form 
of indirect domination, and as a consequence impair the cultural identities of minority 
communities. 
Despite the fact that acts of ethnocide are still being carried out, this subject has not 
been sufficiently addressed in international law. Admittedly, the prohibition of cultural 
suppression is enshrined – although not explicitly under the specific name ethnocide – in 
Article 8(1) of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
which states: “indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to 
forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.” The aforementioned declaration is an 
important instrument aimed at eliminating human rights violations against indigenous 
peoples, but it does not constitute a legally binding document. Therefore, it is in accord-
ance with the general trend of demonstrating the international community’s interest in 
matters connected with cultural rights through the implementation of the instruments 
of soft law. Undoubtedly, however, this subject merits more attention, since the obser-
vance of cultural rights ensures the perpetuation of distinct groups.72
Concluding remarks
Judicial elaboration proves that a lot has to be done in order to secure desirable, harmo-
nious and cooperative relations between States and minorities. The reservations of States 
towards minorities can be attributed to the fact that issues of cultural rights pertaining 
to them, especially the territorial rights of indigenous communities and their entitle-
ment to ancestral lands, are inextricably linked to the concept of self-determination. As 
culturally distinct entities, they are often considered as a threat to the State’s territorial 
integrity because of their potential wish for secession. In order to avoid this, govern-
ments undertake attempts to integrate and assimilate them, frequently violating their 
basic rights. However, the problem of securing the cultural rights pertaining to them 
should be treated as a matter of recognition within already existing States.73 
72 A.F. Vrdoljak, Self-Determination and Cultural Rights, in Cultural Human Rights, op. cit., p. 41. 
73 D. Maybury-Lewis, op. cit., p. 56. It has also been stated explicitly in the Human Rights Com-
mittee’s General Comment no. 23: “the enjoyment of the rights to which article 27 relates does 
not prejudice the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State party.” V. General Comment 
no. 23: The Rights of Minorities (Article 27), § 3.2. In the same document the Committee 
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It is a truism to say that most existing nations are not culturally homogenous enti-
ties. That is why it is so important to create conditions for the amicable coexistence of 
different cultural traditions. The relevance of cultural diversity is being emphasized by 
UNESCO, which has advocated for that concept from the very beginning of its exist-
ence, since pluralism plays an important role in the organisation’s discourse.74 According 
to UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity “culture takes diverse forms 
across time and space. This diversity is embodied in the uniqueness and plurality of the 
identities of the groups and societies making up humankind. As a source of exchange, 
innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity 
is for nature. In this sense, it is the common heritage of humanity and should be recog-
nized and affirmed for the benefit of present and future generations.” 
In order to complete the present study, it is worth recalling the view of Anthony 
Giddens, who argues that racist attitudes in modern societies take the form of ‘cultural 
racism’ based on the criteria of cultural differences.75 He stipulates that ‘new racism’ has 
already replaced the concept of ‘biological racism’, since it is more often exercised on 
cultural rather than biological grounds.76 Giddens observes that the values of the major-
ity culture set standards for creating the hierarchy and any reluctance to assimilate with 
the majority may result in marginalisation.77 
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summary
Cultural Identity in the Case-Law of the Human Rights Committee
The aim of the article is to present the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee 
on Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concerning 
the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. Therefore, 
the study examines the underprivileged position of minorities within States and focuses 
on their will to survive as a distinct culture. Examination of the aforementioned case-
law provides an insight into the Committee’s understanding of the concept of cultural 
identity. 
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